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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1434
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury threorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.
Schlagwörter: 
Collective decision‐making
deliberations
optimal committee sizing
voting rules
JEL: 
D71
D78
D81
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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