Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/153867
Authors: 
Maurin, Vincent
Vidal, Jean-Pierre
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper 1434
Abstract: 
How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury threorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.
Subjects: 
Collective decision‐making
deliberations
optimal committee sizing
voting rules
JEL: 
D71
D78
D81
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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