Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153824 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1390
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we discuss how fraud liability regimes impact the price structure that is chosen by a monopolistic payment platform, in a setting where merchants can invest in fraud detection technologies. We show that liability allocation rules distort the price structure charged by platforms or banks to consumers and merchants with respect to a case where such a responsibility regime is not implemented. We determine the allocation of fraud losses between the payment platform and the merchants that maximises the platform's profit and we compare it to the allocation that maximises social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
fraud
interchange fees
liability
Payment card systems
two-sided markets
JEL: 
G21
L31
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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