Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153657 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1223
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement traditional retail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the "bright side" of wholesale funding: sophisticated financiers can monitor banks, disciplining bad but refinancing good ones. This paper models a "dark side" of wholesale funding. In an environment with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term wholesale financiers have lower incentives to conduct costly monitoring, and instead may withdraw based on negative public signals, triggering inefficient liquidations. Comparative statics suggest that such distortions of incentives are smaller when public signals are less relevant and project liquidation costs are higher, e.g., when banks hold mostly relationship-based small business loans.
Schlagwörter: 
Financial crises
liquidity risk
regulation
Wholesale Funding
JEL: 
G21
G28
G33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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