Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/152998 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 564
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper first shows that the forecast error incurred when assuming that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target announced by the central bank is typically at least as small and often smaller than forecast errors of model-based and published inflation forecasts. It then shows that there are substantial benefits in having rule-of-thumb agents who simply trust that the central bank will deliver its pre-announced inflation objective.
Schlagwörter: 
credibility
inflation forecast
inflation targeting
monetary policy
JEL: 
E5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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