Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/152778 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 344
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain consistent to a public finance approach by an explicit consideration of all the distortions that are relevant to the Ramsey planner. This strategy entails two main advantages. First, it allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that evolves around a steady-state which is not necessarily efficient. Second, it allows to describe a full range of alternative dynamic equilibria when price setters in both countries are completely forwardlooking and households’ preferences are not restricted. In this context, we study optimal policy both in the long-run and along a dynamic path, and we compare optimal commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation. By deriving a second order accurate solution to the policy functions, we also characterize the welfare gains from international policy cooperation.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperation
imperfect competition
Nash equilibrium
optimal monetary policy
Ramsey planner
sticky prices
JEL: 
E52
F41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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