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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 316
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is modeled as a 'cheap talk' game. We show that: (1) unless the interests of the countries are perfectly aligned, Þrst best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically across countries to escape closure.
Schlagwörter: 
cheap talk
closure
multinational banks
supervision
JEL: 
F36
G21
G28
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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