Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/152727
Authors: 
Felgenhauer, Mike
Grüner, Hans Peter
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper 293
Abstract: 
Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external influence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest politics. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal.
Subjects: 
Committees
common agency
interest groups
voting
JEL: 
D71
D72
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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