Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/152693
Authors: 
Catenaro, Marco
Vidal, Jean-Pierre
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper 259
Abstract: 
In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.
Subjects: 
International Fiscal Issues
Policy Co-ordination
JEL: 
E61
H87
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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