Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150684 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research No. 136
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a sorting model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs and contrast it with the classic agency model of performance pay. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our sorting model. First, prior to controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for the higher earnings associated with performance pay, the job satisfaction of those in performance pay jobs is the same as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support the sorting model, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance Pay
Worker Heterogeneity
Ability
Risk Preferences
Sorting
JEL: 
D80
J24
J28
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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