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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 227-251
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.
Schlagwörter: 
Negatively assortative matching
risk-sharing
stable match
JEL: 
D00
C78
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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