Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150273
Authors: 
Levine, David Knudsen
Modica, Salvatore
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 89-131
Abstract: 
We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and rise of Communism in China.
Subjects: 
Evolution
conventions
markov chains
state power
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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