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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 865-914
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on "career concerns" in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.
Schlagwörter: 
Principal-agent model
optimal contract
learning
private information
reputation
career
JEL: 
D82
D83
E24
J41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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