Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150231
Authors: 
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
McLean, Richard P.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 555-582
Abstract: 
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Subjects: 
Discontinuous game
potential game
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
stable set
essential equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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