Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150229
Authors: 
Chen, Ying
Eraslan, Hulya
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 483-513
Abstract: 
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would ``compromise" or ``fight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together.
Subjects: 
Legislative bargaining
rhetoric
cheap talk
private information
bundling
JEL: 
C78
D72
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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