Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150204
Authors: 
Ordoñez, Guillermo L.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 653-700
Abstract: 
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers with intermediate and good reputations, magnifying otherwise small economic shocks.
Subjects: 
Reputation
global games
risk-taking
fragility
JEL: 
D82
E44
G01
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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