Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150198
Authors: 
Esponda, Ignacio
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 467-501
Abstract: 
I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (1967-8) `Bayesian games', that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The solution concept applied to this environment is rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE), which integrates both learning from feedback (in the spirit of self-confirming equilibrium) and from introspection (in the spirit of rationalizability). I provide an epistemic definition of RCE and obtain a characterization in terms of a procedure that generalizes iterated deletion of strategies that are not a best response.
Subjects: 
Rationalizability
self-confirming equilibrium
epistemic framework
robust equilibrium predictions
JEL: 
C70
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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