Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150186
Authors: 
Forges, Françoise
Vida, Péter
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 95-123
Abstract: 
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
Subjects: 
Bayesian game
cheap talk
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
pre-play communication
JEL: 
C72
D70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.