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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 395-423
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so. Our egalitarian transfer solution rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.
Schlagwörter: 
Bipartite graph
bilateral trade
strategy-proofness
equal treatment of equals
single-peaked preferences
JEL: 
C72
D63
D61
C78
D71
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Dokumentart: 
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