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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 219-256
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) of a dynamic game with players' participation decisions followed by a common agency game of public goods provision. We illustrate various properties of the FRP-Core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
Schlagwörter: 
Endogenous coalition formation
externalities
public good
perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
free riders
free-riding-proof core
lobbying
common agency game
JEL: 
H41
C71
C72
D61
D72
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Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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