Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150104 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2007 [Pages:] 469-487
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our sufficient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arcwise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theorems when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. When the set of social alternatives is finite, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition. This condition is similar to, but slightly weaker than, connectedness.
Schlagwörter: 
Revenue equivalence
mechanism design
incentive compatibility
non-differentiable approach
connected type space
JEL: 
C02
C72
D44
D82
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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