Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150092 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2007 [Pages:] 71-113
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is demonstrated in a variety of dynamic economic settings, including the classical optimal growth and tree cutting problems, repeated games, and bargaining. Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent scenarios are considered.
Subjects: 
Delay aversion
impatience
consumption smoothing
time consistency
JEL: 
D11
D90
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.