Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150084 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2006 [Pages:] 369-393
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.
Subjects: 
Ex post incentive compatibility
multi-dimensional information
interdependent values
JEL: 
D44
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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