Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150080 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2006 [Pages:] 233-273
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
Subjects: 
Two-sided matching
cooperative game theory
core
JEL: 
C78
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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