Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150075
Authors: 
Che, Yeon-Koo
Gale, Ian
Year of Publication: 
2006
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2006 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 95-118
Abstract: 
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.
Subjects: 
Auctions
multidimensional types and atoms
risk aversion
Gateaux differentiable preferences
JEL: 
C70
D44
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5
Document Type: 
Article

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