Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150073
Authors: 
Ely, Jeffrey C.
Peski, Marcin
Year of Publication: 
2006
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2006 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 19-65
Abstract: 
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential about a player's information to identify behavior. We specialize to two player games and the solution concept of interim rationalizability. We construct the universal type space for rationalizability and characterize the types in terms of their beliefs. Infinite hierarchies of beliefs <i>over conditional beliefs</i>, which we call Delta-hierarchies, are what turn out to matter. We show that any two types in any two type spaces have the same rationalizable sets in all games if and only if they have the same Delta-hierarchies.
Subjects: 
Interim rationalizability
belief hierarchies
JEL: 
C72
D82
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5
Document Type: 
Article

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