Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150045
Authors: 
Benndorf, Volker
Rau, Holger A.
Sölch, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research 304
Abstract: 
This paper studies motivational crowding-out effects after financial incentives are lowered. In a real-effort setting, workers receive a piece rate before financial incentives are substituted by a one-time payment. Under the fixed payment, effort is significantly lower only when preceded by piece-rate incentives. The decrease is driven by a fraction of men who reduce their effort by 12%, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding-out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard all alternative explanations besides from motivational crowding out.
Subjects: 
gender differences
incentives
motivational crowding out
real-effort task
JEL: 
C91
J16
M54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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