Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149893
Authors: 
Benndorf, Volker
Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 243
Abstract: 
We examine the impact of behavioral noise on equilibrium selection in a hawk-dove game with a model that linearly interpolates between the one- and two-population structures in an evolutionary context. Perturbed best response dynamics generates two hypotheses in addition to the bifurcation predicted by standard replicator dynamics. First, when replicator dynamics suggests mixing behavior (close to the one-population model), there will be a bias against hawkish play. Second, polarizing behavior as predicted by replicator dynamics in the vicinity of the two-population model will be less extreme in the presence of behavioral noise. We find both e.ects in our data set.
Subjects: 
evolutionary game theory
perturbed best response dynamics
experiment in continuous time
hawk-dove game
JEL: 
C62
C73
C91
C92
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-242-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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