Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149661
Autoren: 
Strausz, Roland
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper 2
Zusammenfassung: 
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding's after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard.
Schlagwörter: 
Crowdfunding
entrepreneurship
moral hazard
demand uncertainty
JEL: 
D82
G32
L11
M31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
560.84 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.