Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149660
Title: 
Authors: 
Malmendier, Ulrike
Schmidt, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 1
Abstract: 
In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.
Subjects: 
Gift exchange
externalities
lobbyism
corruption
reciprocity
social preferences
JEL: 
C91
D62
D73
I11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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