Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/149584 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 16-07
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream …rm. The supplier’s adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream …rm has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the market by initially renting the downstream …rm’s reputation. The downstream …rm may optimally source its input externally, even though sourcing internally would be better in terms of productive e¢ ciency. Since an entrant in the downstream market may lack reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to entry arising from higher input costs.
Schlagwörter: 
Adverse Selection
Certi fication Intermediaries
Incumbency Advantage
Experience Goods
Outsourcing
Branding
Barriers to Entry
JEL: 
D4
L12
L4
L43
L51
L52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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