Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/149552 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 230
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
This paper empirically evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors who came to the position from a business background (CEO governors), focusing on income growth, unemployment, private investment, and income inequality. Methodologically, I apply a matching method to account for the endogeneity of political selection. I find that the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.6 percentage points higher annual income growth rate, a 0.4 pp higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and a 0.6 percentage points lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non-CEO governors. Income inequality decreases when CEO governors hold office.
Subjects: 
U.S. Governors
economic growth
unemployment
income inequality
businessmen
entropy balancing.
JEL: 
C21
D31
E24
J60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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