Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149293
Authors: 
Bastani, Spencer
Blomquist, Sören
Micheletto, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6206
Abstract: 
Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are private information and highlight that, even though pensions, by crowding out private savings, adversely affect the achievement of the golden-rule, they can be used as a mimicking-deterring device that makes it easier for the government to achieve the desired redistributive goals.
Subjects: 
public pensions
dynamic optimal income taxation
capital income taxation
tagging
JEL: 
H21
H55
H63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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