Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149278
Authors: 
Cornes, Richard
Itaya, Jun-ichi
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6191
Abstract: 
A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit and enjoy market power. Examples include the labor-managed firm, mixed oligopoly, and delegation models. These models typically retain the aggregative structure of the conventional Cournot model of imperfect competition. We exploit this fact and apply the framework recently developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005, 2011) to analyze the properties of the equilibrium in such games. We show that existing treatments often make more restrictive assumptions than necessary to generate their results. Specifically, we identify conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium, and we explore the comparative static properties of these conditions.
Subjects: 
aggregative game
oligopoly
Hahn’s Condition
non-profit maximization
share function
JEL: 
C72
D43
L21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.