Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149256
Authors: 
Dufwenberg, Martin
Van Essen, Matt
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6169
Abstract: 
We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on weaker and less controversial epistemic foundations than needed to justify backward inductions more generally. Is the account empirically relevant? We design and report results from a relevant experiment.
Subjects: 
backward induction
interactive epistemology
player set cardinality
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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