Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149222
Authors: 
Angelini, Viola
Bertoni, Marco
Stella, Luca
Weiss, Christoph T.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10363
Abstract: 
By allowing people to obtain divorce without the consent of their spouse, Unilateral Divorce Laws (UDLs) increase the risk of divorce. Using the staggered introduction of UDLs across European countries, we show that households exposed to UDLs for longer time accumulate more savings. This effect holds for both financial and total wealth and is stronger at higher quantiles of the wealth distribution. Longer exposure to UDLs also increases female labour market participation and financial literacy, contributing to uncover the mechanisms through which the risk of divorce may affect savings. Our results are consistent with a precautionary motive for saving.
Subjects: 
household savings
financial literacy
divorce
JEL: 
G11
J12
J22
J32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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