Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149014
Authors: 
Sun, Lan
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557
Abstract: 
In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency. However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling games.
Subjects: 
Signaling Games
Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
Equilibrium Refinement
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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