Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148873
Authors: 
Basteck, Christian
Mantovani, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2016-037
Abstract: 
We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Boston-mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a strategy-proof mechanisms 'levels the playing-field'. Finally, we document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Boston than under Deferred Acceptance.
Subjects: 
laboratory experiment
school choice
strategy-proofness
cognitive ability
mechanism design
JEL: 
C78
C91
D82
I24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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