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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2016-029
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will a voluntary or obligatory upfront payment by clients induce more truthful advice? According to the results, both types of payment lead to more truthful advice. More generally, in a senderreceiver game with conflict of interest, an upfront payment to the sender by the receiver improves information transmission.
Schlagwörter: 
financial advisors
asymmetric information
sender-receiver game
reciprocity
experiments
JEL: 
C91
D82
D03
L15
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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