Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148566
Authors: 
Bó, Inácio
Hakimov, Rustamdjan
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2016-209
Abstract: 
We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism based on a new family of procedures being used in the field, in which information about tentative allocations is provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each school (IDAM). A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium strategy akin to truthful behavior under IDAM and IDAM-NC than truthful behavior itself under DA. Moreover, the provision of intermediate cutoff values in IDAM leads to higher rates of equilibrium behavior than in IDAM-NC and a higher robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of using iterative mechanisms in centralized college admissions in practice.
Subjects: 
Market Design
Matching
Iterative Mechanisms
College Admissions
Experiments
JEL: 
C78
C92
D63
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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