Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148469 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 244 [Publisher:] Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2016
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
The unequal distribution of refugees across countries could unravel the international refugee protection system or, in the case of the EU, hinder a common policy response to refugee crises. A way to distribute refugees efficiently, while respecting their rights, is to combine two market mechanisms. First, a market for tradable refugee admission quotas that allows refugees to be established wherever it is less costly to do so. Second, a matching system that links refugees to their preferred destinations, and host countries to their preferred types of refugees. The proposal is efficient but has yet to be tested in practice.
Subjects: 
international migration
refugees
tradable quotas
matching
public goods
JEL: 
F22
F5
H87
I3
K33
O19
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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