Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148459 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 234 [Publisher:] Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2016
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Firms regularly use incentives to motivate their employees to be more productive. However, often little attention is paid to the language used in employment contracts to describe these incentives. It may be more effective to present incentives as entitlements that can be lost by failing to reach a performance target, rather than as additional rewards that can be gained by reaching that target. However, emphasizing the potential losses incurred as a result of failure may entail hidden costs for the employer, as it may damage the trust relationship between a firm and its employees.
Schlagwörter: 
employee motivation
bonuses
penalties
loss aversion
contract framing
JEL: 
C9
D02
D03
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
831.47 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.