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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 223 [Publisher:] Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2016
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Economists typically predict that people are inherently selfish; however, experimental evidence suggests that this is often not the case. In particular, delegating a choice (such as a wage) to the performing party may imbue this party with a sense of responsibility, leading to improved outcomes for both the delegating entity and the performing party. This strategy can be risky, as some people will still choose to act in a selfish manner, causing adverse consequences for productivity and earnings. An important issue to consider is therefore how to encourage a sense of responsibility in the performing party.
Schlagwörter: 
delegation
responsibility
social outcomes
experimental evidence
JEL: 
B49
C91
D03
J2
J3
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Article

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