Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148319 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1623
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative association between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative association between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I perform an empirical investigation based on a panel of 58 OECD and emerging market economies since 1980 and find evidence of this signaling channel.
Schlagwörter: 
signaling
fiscal austerity
sovereign debt
credit ratings
JEL: 
D82
E62
F34
G24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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