Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148228
Authors: 
Kähler, Leonhard
Eisenack, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics V-393-16
Abstract: 
International environmental agreements have had varying success in the past; the theoretical literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) explains why freeriding is so common. This paper allows for two strategically different types of countries. Damage functions are concave for some countries (contrary to the standard convexity assumption). This leads to strategic substitutes and complements in emissions reduction within the same model. The interaction of both country types can lead to a stable agreement that is larger than in the standard case, and to more global abatement. Such a stable agreement constitutes an island of stability in addition to the small standard agreement.
JEL: 
D21
H23
D58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
313.82 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.