Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148226
Authors: 
Hagen, Achim
Altamirano Cabrera, Juan Carlos
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics V-391-16
Abstract: 
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on the abatement decisions of countries. This influence affects members of an international environmental agreement as well as outsiders. However, in the case of agreement members, the effects of lobbying are not restricted to the lobby's host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on the agreement stability.
Subjects: 
interest groups
coalition theory
environmental policy making
international environmental agreements
JEL: 
C72
D72
D78
H41
Q28
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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