Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148205
Authors: 
Kitamura, Hiroshi
Matsushima, Noriaki
Sato, Misato
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 978
Abstract: 
This study constructs a simplest model to examine anticompetitive exclusive contracts that prevent a downstream buyer from buying input from a new up-stream supplier. Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts.
Subjects: 
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive contracts
Nash bargaining
JEL: 
L12
L41
L42
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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