Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147944
Authors: 
Fehrler, Sebastian
Fischbacher, Urs
Schneider, Maik T.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10258
Abstract: 
We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.
Subjects: 
candidates
elections
campaigns
primaries
contest
voting
political economy
experiment
lying aversion
self-selection
cheap talk
JEL: 
C92
D71
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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