Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147861
Authors: 
Chen, Yefeng
Jiang, Shuguang
Villeval, Marie Claire
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10175
Abstract: 
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective sanction diminishes the officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in the absence of corruption.
Subjects: 
corruption
social dilemma
collective risk
sanction
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D73
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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