Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147733
Authors: 
Luo, Yongli
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Economics & Finance [ISSN:] 2332-2039 [Volume:] 2 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 1-17
Abstract: 
This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B- or H-shares; it implies that cross-listings could be employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is important in determining cross-listings. Under the weak corporate governance institution, Chinese firms were chosen to cross-list based on political considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the quality of state owned enterprises. The results are drawn on agency theory, signalling hypothesis and bonding hypothesis.
Subjects: 
cross-listing
executive compensation
corporate governance
China
JEL: 
G3
G15
G32
G38
J33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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